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LEGAL PLANNING FOR AGRICULTURE
FARNSWORTH L. JENNINGS AND ROBERT C. SULLIVANt
A decision which to a critic of the legal system is sure to seem it
labored attempt to maintain our competitive regime is that of
New State Ice Company v. Liebmann.1 To the more lawyerly
minded the case will perhaps create not so much dissent as provo-
cation. Not less interesting than the decision are some of the sweep-
ing dicta with which the majority opinion is generously provided.
One statement of the court is as follows: "And this court has defi-
nitely said that the production or sale of food or clothing cannot
be subjected to legislative regulation on the basis of a public
use; . . .2
This utterance represents the crystallization of a judicial attitude
which has halted or rendered inadequate all attempts at exorcising
the twin demons of low prices and over-production that have pos-
sessed portions of the farming industry in recent years.3 Such
utterances make it possible for the industry to shift a share of the
blame upon the law.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the New State
Ice Company case, said:
"The people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency
more serious than war. Misery is widespread, in a time, not of scarcity,
but of overabundance. The long-continued depression has brought un-
precedented unemployment, a catastrophic fall in commodity prices, and
a volume of economic losses which threaten our financial institutions ...
-Farnsworth L. Jennings is a Sterling Fellow and Robert C. Sullivan is a
Research Assistant in the Yale School of Law. The authors gratefully ac-
knowledge their indebtedness to Professor Walton H. Hamilton.
1. 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
2. Id. at 277.
3. No case involving the constitutionality of a statute restricting the pro-
duction of food or clothing has been decided by the courts. The ice case
presents the closest parallel. Compare also F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin
Utilities Co., 180 Ark. 770, 22 S. W. (2d) 993 (1929). The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin has declared that a statute of that state which forbade the man-
ufacture of oleomargarine violated the constitttion of Wisconsin. Contrast
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932), up-
holding a state statute designed to conserve the oil and natural gas supply
of a state. For a discussion of this problem, see Marshall and Meyers, Legal
Planning of Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration (1933) 42 YA1An
L. J. 702. For other dicta asserting that such regulation would be unconsti-
tutional see Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Brother v.
Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of In-
dustrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
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Economists are searching for the cause of the disorder and are re-
examining the basis of our industrial structure. Business men are seek-
ing possible remedies. Most of them realize that failure to distribute
widely the profits of industry has been a prime cause of our present
plight. But rightly or wrongly, many persons think that one of the major
contributing causes has been unbridled competition . . . men point to
the excess capacity of our productive facilities resulting from their vast
expansion without corresponding increase in the consumptive capacity
of the people . . .All agree that irregularity in employment-the greatest
of our evils-cannot be overcome unless production and consumption are
more nearly balanced. Mlany insist that there must be some form of
economic control." 4
Over these fundamental shifts in economic relationships to which
Mr. Justice Brandeis refers a notable fog persists. The merest out-
line of the subject becomes so intricate that it is not easy to see it
steadily and as a whole. Explanation, argument and recrimination
have done little to bring consensus of opinion. However, the inci-
dence of our present economic crisis, which has not become much
less mysterious as it has become more prolonged, has not funda-
mentally affected the agricultural situation. For the farmer the
depression did not begin in 1930.; It began with the economic mal-
adjustments of productive capacity created by war conditions and
maintained by the growing inelasticity of the present economic
structure. Consequently, the case of agriculture may be said per-
haps to be somewhat clearer than is the general industrial picture.0
The Economy of Farming
The fact that farming has been in a very unhealthy condition
for over a decade even the least critical must admit. It has not only
4. Supra note 1, at 306 et seq.
5. See 1 RECENT SocIAL TRNDs (1933) 223: "This high prosperity of the
United States in the post-war years was, however, not shared by agriculture. Some
time before the present depression the state of American agriculture had begun
to illustrate the instabilities of the world economy through the decline in agri-
cultural prices, the decrease in the value of farm property and the persistence
of a large burden of farm debt incurred when both the prices of farm property
and of agricultural products were at much higher levels. It is indeed not
unlikely that the standard of living of the American farmer in the post-war
era was in part sustained by the proceeds of mortgage debt which he found
it increasingly difficult to liquidate. The existence of this condition of agri-
cultural depression was confirmed by the steady and increasing number of bank
failures in the rural areas which long antedated the wave of suspension of
city banks occasioned by the business depression of 1930." See also ANruAL
REPORT OF SEncnARY OF AGRICULTURE (1931) 24.
6. For conditions in other fields which in material respects closely parallel
those of agriculture, see HASTILTON AND WRIGHT, THE CASE OF BITuzauNous
COAL (1925) and Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production
(1932) 41 YALE L. T. 33.
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long since ceased to be a paying business but it has become a losing
one.7  It has been carried on by making heavy demands on the
people who are engaged in it and at the sacrifice of soil-conservation
and capital assets. Allowance for interest on investments or for
depreciation no longer have a place in the accounting of the farmer."
7. The receipts of 29% of the farmers, according to the YARBooK o
AGRICULTURE (1932) 895, were substantially less than their cash outlay for
production purposes in 1930. In the same year 59% of the farmers received
net returns of less than $500, and 17% received more than $500 but less than
$1,000.
The Department of Agriculture estimates that the cost of producing with
reasonable efficiency a bushel of wheat is $1.09. On March 1, 1933, wheat was
selling in primary markets at $.63 a bushel. The cost of producing a bushel
of corn is estimated at $.89. On March 1st the selling price in primary markets
was $.39. Cotton which costs $.20 a pound to produce was selling at $.06 a
pound. These selling prices are even higher than the record low made during
the summer of 1932.
The index number for all grain prices (pre-war average 1910-1914 being taken
as 100) in December, 1931, was 52. Cotton stood at 45; fruits and vegetables
at 68; meat animals at 68; dairy products at 92; and poultry products at 120.
However, the average for the year for poultry products stood at 94.
In December, 1932, prices of all farm products stood at an index of 54, prices
paid by farmers for commodities bought was 106, farm taxes stood at about 250,
farm wages 84. The general wholesale price level of all commodities stood at
94. Industrial wage rates were around 175.
8. The gross income from farm production was twelve billion dollars in
1929, which was considered a lean year. It then dropped to something over
nine billions in 1930, to seven billions in 1931, and will run around five billions
for 1932. See THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION, DEPARTMENT or AGnicuwunv
BULLETIN (December 1, 1932) p. 2.
Statistics compiled at the University of Illinois from account books of about
one thousand farms show earnings of 1.8% on the farm investment in 1927
as compared with 4.3% in 1924, 3.3% in 1925, and 2.3% in 1926. This return
has practically disappeared in the last three years. JOHN D. BLAoK, Aonxouy.-
TURAL REFoRM: IN UNITED STATES (1929) 21.
CURRENT VALUE OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE AND INCOME
AvAILABLE FOR CAPITAL AND MANAGEMENT, 1924-1930,
Income available Income as
Capital for capital per cent
Year Total Total Used and management of capital
'Million Dollars Million Dollars Million Dollars Per cent
1924 57,718 51,293 1,088 4.0
1925 57,861 51,304 1,292 4.7
1926 56,754 50,065 1,005 3.7
1927 57,256 50,436 1,065 3.9
1928 58,141 51,189 972 3.4
1929 58,130 51,046 1,060 3.8
1930 52,747 45,747 -346 -1.4
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Indeed the returns from farming have been so meagre in the post-
war period that the outlay has been met only by consistently adding
to the structure of a vast indebtedness 0 which has finally resulted
in the situation that is now being dramatized by the activities of
farmer organizations.
That concern for the farmer is not merely a matter of al-
truism, appropriate as that is, is abundantly demonstrated on
every side. The general public has only a less concern in the resfor-
ing of prosperity to the farming districts than have the farmers
themselves. There are two facets to the industry of agriculture.
One is to provide its products at not more than a reasonable cost.
The other is to secure to farmers a standard of living approaching
that of other industrial groups. Neither of these can be precisely
defined. Conflicts in economic society do not admit of final deter-
mination. At the same time the integration of our economic
society is now so complete that in the larger view conflicts between
industrial groups have lost the sharpness they once possessed. The
derangement of farming has resulted in the gradual diminishing
of the farmers' purchasing power,10 to the hurt of manufacturers
and their employees. Until the purchasing power of the farmer is
restored, the recovery of industry will be seriously retarded. n Even
more important, possibly, has been the imperilling of the general
financial structure. Liquidation of farm assets has become so diffi-
cult and disorganized that a great deal of capital has been frozen.
Farm obligations have been successfully evaded on a wholesale
scale, and fear for the future has been intensified. Banks, invest-
ment houses, and insurance companies record farm paper as dubious
assets while the reverberations of their depreciation have involved
the financial integrity of the nation's credit facilities.
[Statement prepared for Interstate Commerce Commission, May, 1932. U. S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE p. 32].
Agriculture as a whole earned no net income in 1930 and experienced an even
greater loss in 1931 and 1932. The sudden and considerable decline in gross
income was accompanied by only a moderate decrease in expenses of production,
farmers being unable to make any noticeable changes in expenditures except
for feed, farm labor and machinery.
9. See note 21, infra.
10. Shrinkage in farm incomes is restricting the purchase of industrial
goods. As most of the returns were needed to meet production costs and
fixed debt charges and taxes, there has been a drastic curtailment of ex-
penditures. Purchases have been practically limited to bare necessities.
The ratio of prices received to prices paid by farmers gave an index number
of 101 in 1914, 118 in 1917, 99 in 1920, 88 in 1923, 85 in 1927, 80 in 1930,
and 51 in November, 1932. THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION, stpra note 8, at 21.




Many interlocking causes, social, economic, and legal have brought
farming to its present demoralized state. In the older America
of before the war the farmers occupied a relatively favored posi-
tion. 12 The volume of 'farm products was expanding at a rate
slightly below that of a population which was growing rapidly due
to a high birth rate and to immigration of over a million a year,18
while manufacturing was expanding many times as fast under con-
ditions of rigorous competition.14 Industrial integration had only
just begun to convert the farm from an independent communal unit
into a dependent part of a vast interlocking commercial machine
where the money crop of cotton or wheat or tobacco or hogs must
12. In 1820 the percentage of all gainfully employed persons in the United
States 10 years or older engaged in agricultural pursuits was 83 per cent.
In 1840 the percentage was 77; 1870, 47; 1900, 35; 1910, 33; 1920, 26; and
in 1930, 21.
INDEx NUMBERS OF PRICE LEvms.
(1910-1914 = 100)
Prices Received Prices Paid Buying Power of
by Farmers by Farmers Farm Produets
1910 103 98 106
1920 205 206 99
1925 147 159 92
1928 139 156 90
1930 117 146 80
1932 54 106 51
See the article by Eric England, Ass't Chief Economist, Department of
Agriculture, in the New York Times, February 5, 1933.
13. Ten years ago the population of the nation was increasing nearly
2,000,000 a year; now the increase is only about 800,000. The number of
children born in the nation is decreasing between 50,000 and 125,000 each
year. In the thirty years 1870-1900 the population of the United States was
doubled. In the thirty years 1900-1930 it increased less than 60 per cent. The
rate of increase in production of agricultural products closely paralleled the
growth in population up to the War period. However, since that time the
world population has increased only 10%, whereas world production of food
products has increased 16%. ANNUAL REPORT OF SECRETARY OF AGRICULTUIIF
(1931) 43, and H. BADING, CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1932) 172.
14. In the 30 years between 1899 and 1929 the industrial production had
far outstripped population growth; whereas the latter had increased about
60%, industrial' output had increased about 200%, or more than three
times the rate of population growth. That industrial expansion of 30 years
has been wiped out during the course of the current depression, in progress
since 1929, for the ratio of output to population in 1932 was back to that
of 1900. THE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK FOR 1933, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF Aini-
CULTURE (Miscellaneous Publication No. 156) 87.
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provide the farmer's living. The farmer was not yet a specialized
producer who sold practically the whole of his produce.
The outbreak of the war brought with it the opportunity of feeding
the warring nations. Agricultural production and specialization
were pushed by this unnatural stimulant to undreamed-of heights.15
Land values and prices tripled and quadrupled,"' profits were de-
voted to the purchase of improved machinery and to the bringing in
of new land. Millions of new acres were made tillable, and those
which were already under cultivation were utilized as effectively
as possible. Consequently the reaction which followed the war was
immediate and severe. But besides the re-establishment of European
farming there was also the fact that even the pre-war purchasing
power of both sides had been broken. The feverish event of the
war was responsible, furthermore, for the creation of tremendous
new producing areas in Canada, Argentine, Australia and South
Africa. 17 However, even after several years had elapsed the condi-
15. During the War the production of wheat was pushed to the unprece-
dented total of above one billion bushels for one year. The average yield per
acre at this time was 17 bushels. In 1910 and in 1911 total production of
wheat averaged slightly over 600 million bushels. The average yield per acre
was 13 bushels. This represented an increase in output of almost 40%.
16. INDEX NUMBERs OF ESTIBIATED VALUE OF FARi R.A ESTATE PEn Acpx
(1912-1914 = 100)
1913 1915 1917 1919 1920 1921 1922 1924 1927 1930 1931 1932
100 103 117 140 170 157 139 130 119 115 106 89
During the pre-war years, 1910-1914, the producers of wheat received $.88
per bushel. This sum rose to $2.14 during the War, but it had fallen to
$.32 by November, 1932. A similar rise and fall is indicated by cotton, corn,
and hog prices:
Cotton Corn Hogs
1910-1914--$.12 per pound $ .64 per bushel $10.42 per head
1917-1918- .27 " " 1.32 " " 20.00 " "
1932 - .06 " " .19 " " 6.00 " "
YEARooK OF AGRICULTURE (1932) 578, 608, 658, and THE AGnICULTURAL
SITUATION, .supra note 8, at 2.
17. In addition, the transformation of the United States, as a result of
the war, from a foremost debtor to an outstanding creditor nation has made
the foreign disposition of agricultural surpluses increasingly difficult. During
the twelve years since the war we normally have been exporting more than
one-half of our cotton, one-fourth of our wheat and nearly one-half of our
packing house lard. "Since 1919 the problem of the United States has been
to learn how to act as a creditor nation. Unfortunately, it is a terrific job
to change suddenly the psychology of a pioneer debtor people to that of a
mature creditor nation. For twelve years we have been stumbling in the
dark, refusing to make the plans which a creditor nation must make if it is
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tion of agriculture did not begin to improve. It became increasingly
evident that new factors had come into being which quite apart
from the war spelled agricultural distress. Productive capacity,
far from undergoing any readjustment, actually continued to grow,
while demand began relatively to decrease. The ominous deduction
was inevitable that agricultural production was breaking away from
the requirements of population. According to a statement of the
present Secretary of Agriculture, "there are some 50,000,000 acres
of crop land in the United States producing food, cotton and tobacco
which cannot be consumed inside the country." 18 This is a far cry
from the "scarcity economics" preached during the nineteenth
century when there was genuine concern over the feat of getting a
sufficient supply of agricultural .products. The trick which the
acute mind of Malthus believed impossible has been done with an
added gesture.'9
to avoid disaster." Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, in the New
York Times, January 22, 1933.
18. In the New York Times, January 22, 1933. See also ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE (1931) 24: "Barring such temporary fall
in demand as we experienced in the past year due to world-wide business de-
pression, our difficulty is not a sudden emergency, but a cumulative over-
production."
19. In 1927, W. J. Spillman, Agricultural Economist for the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, estimated that the surplus
acreage under cultivation (that is, in excess of normal requirements) as to
each of our five major crops was as follows: wheat, 8 million acres; cotton,
10 million acres; corn, 6 million acres; oats, 6 million acres; hay, 8 million
acres.
The indices of the volume of net agricultural production in the United States
(1919-1927 = 100) are as follows: 1921, 87; 1923, 101; 1925, 106; 1927, 106;
1929, 109; 1931, 111. Statement prepared for. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, supra note 8, at 11.
While world population during the past five years has been about 18o
greater than in 1913, world production of leading crops has averaged 23%
greater. Wheat has increased 40% in world production since 1900. The
world's wheat area is 42 million acres larger than it was before the war.
These figures do not include Russia's acreage which has doubled in the past
six years. Wheat surpluses have piled up steadily. On August 1, 1930, the
world carry-over exceeded 500 million bushels.
The area sown to wheat in our southwestern winter wheat states increased
approximately 4 million acres from 1924 to 1929. During the same period the
area in Canada, Argentina, and Australia combined, increased more than
10 million acres. This is in line with the trend in expansion since 1910. In
the last seven years the world has produced an annual average of 43 million
bushels of wheat more than has been consumed, and the United States carry-
over has piled up to the record total of 275 million bushels. THE AGRICULTURAL
OUTLOOK FOR 1933, 15. Even for the 1932-33 season the total wheat area of
the world has been increased by 4,500,000 acres. In the United States a supply
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The recovery of industry from the aftermath of the war came
with astonishing rapidity. It was made possible principally through
the medium of a vastly growing consumption of its output. The
development of automobile production and distribution, of airplanes,
radios, motion pictures and a hundred other products of the new
machine age took up the pressure of maladjustment. But the farmer
has encountered no such good fortune. The capacity of the human
stomach is limited and even the wardrobe is among the more finite
of human requirements. Along with the restriction on immigration
of about 1,015 million bushels, or around 350,000,000 to 375,000,000 bushels in
excess of probable domestic utilization for the season is predicted.
The world supply of American cotton for 1932-33 is now estimated to be
only slightly less than the record supply of 1931-32 and is more than twice
the world consumption of American cotton during 1931-32. Reports on foreign
production received up to mid-January, 1933, indicate that in 1932-33 it vll
be about 900,000 bales larger than in 1931-32. The apparent supply of American
cotton in the United States on January 1, 1933 was 15,800,000 bales. The carry-
over constitutes the largest part of the total supply. At 13 million bales it is
4,100,000 bales larger than world consumption in 1931-32. Consumption of all
cotton in the United States was 4,900,000 bales in 1931-32 as compared with
5,300,000 bales in 1930-31. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (Mis-
cellaneous Publication No. 139, 1932).
A study of the market records of the principle crops of the country brings out
very forcefully the fact that the farmer very seldom, if ever, gets as large a
return for any crop that is overproduced as he does for one of the size normally
absorbed by the market. On cotton in 1924, the production of a little more
than 13,500,000 bales sold for approximately 23 cents a pound; two years later
a production of 18,000,000 bales sold for about 12," cents a pound; the follow-
ing year's production of 13,000,000 bales sold for slightly over 20 cents a pound,
indicating that as production increases sharply above the normal consuming
demand, the price declines rapidly and increases just as quickly when the pro-
duction drops below the consumption requirements.
On surplus capacity in agricultural production, see: IRVING FISHER, BOOMS
AND DEPRESSIONS (1932) 171; STAmFORD UNIVERSITY FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE
(Miscellaneous Publication No. 6, 1932) 658; 0. FRED BoucKE, LAISSEZ PAmu
AND AFTER (1932) c. X and note on farmers, 241 ct scq.; Scoville Hamlin, ed.,
THE MENACE OF OVERPRODUCTION (1930) 51; WALACES FARIER (April 16,
1932) "Can We Control Production?" 219-220; STUART CHASE, OUT OF THE
DEPRESSION AND AFTER (1931) Part II, "Mlaster Planning"; GEORGE SouL, A
PLANNED SocIErY (1932) c. IX, X; Bernard M. Baruch, A Plan for the Regu-
lation of Production in A PHILOSOPHY OF PRODUCTION (George Frederick, ed.,
1932); WILSON GEE, THE SOcIAL ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE (1932) 77; ORVIL E
M. KIL, THE NEw AGRICULTURE (1932); Arthur M. Hyde, Agricultural Tceter
Board (October, 1931) REvmw OF REViwS; E. G. Nourse, Can the Ainerican
Farm be Saved? in A PRACTICAL PROGRA31 FOR AMERICA (Henry Hazlitt, ed.,
1932); MEAD AND OSTROLENK, HARVEY BAUM, A STUDY OP THE AGRICULTUAL
REVOLUTION (1928); W. J. SPILLMIAN, BALANCING THE OUTPUT (1927); CLAnENcE
A. WILEY, AGRICULTURE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE SINCE 1920 (1930); U. S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (Technical Bulletin No. 297, 1932) 38.
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has gone a steadily declining birth rate, so that increase in demand
for farm produce has become very nearly negligible. On the other
hand an immense and a potentially still more consequential source
9f excess supply has resulted from the vigorous efforts of the agri-
cultural sciences-the expanding mechanization of the farms, the
practice of scientific cultivation, and a shift to more productive
crops. 20 Technology, gathering momentum since the lusty shove
given it by the World War, bids fair to complete a transformation of
agriculture not less far-reaching in its consequences than has oc-
curred in industry. But even with present methods, it may be
estimated that probably one-third of the human and natural resources
employed in agriculture are unnecessary. What will be the figure in
the very near future only a sayer of revelations could tell us. If
order is to be brought into farming this vast source of excess supply
must not be allowed to continue without direction. Along with this
onward march of technology has gone the opening up of considerable
amounts of new land, particularly in Texas, Oklahoma, California
and Montana. Even the disappearance of the horse has joined in
the conspiracy to help agricultural production outrun demand by
setting free for other crops nearly fifteen million acres of land
previously employed in raising oats and hay.
The simplest possible catalogue of the ills of farming cannot,
however, be restricted to the associated matters of overproduction,
surpluses and low prices. In fact it is another situation which has
• 20, Professor J. D. Black estimates (AGRICULTURAL REFORMr IN THE UNITED
STATES (1929) 13) that "production per farm has increased nearly 30 per cent
since 1910." The revolution in farm machinery which accompanied the Civil
Wai" was mainly confined to harvesting machinery. Beyond this, there was
little improvement in agricultural practice. Aside from a few machines, farm-
ing was carried on as it was in the middle ages. By 1890, the total value of
all farm implements in the United States was still less than one-half billion
dollars. It had risen to $750,000,000 by 1900, and by 1910, it had mounted to
one and one-quarter billion dollars, a slow rate of growth corresponding to the
increase in acreage. By 1920, however, the value of farm implements had more
than doubled, reaching a figure of more than three and one-half billion. U. S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (Statistical Abstract, 1925) pp. 684, 602.
, The Special Committee of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Uni-
versities reported in NovenTher, 1932, that the total farm output had increased
15 per cent since the war despite the fact that the number of farms declined
during this period about 2 per cent, and the number of people gainfully em-
ployed in agriculture declined about 4 per cent. The report estimates an increase
pf about 20 per cent in production per person employed, brought about by
increased mechanization, improvements in animal and field husbandry, and
shifts from less productive to more productive crops and animals. See H. W.
QUAINTANCE, THE INFLUENCE OF FARM MACHINERY UPON PRODUCTION AND
LABOR, (Publications of the American Economic Association, 3rd ser., vol. V,
uo. 4, 1904) 39. MEAD AND OSTROLENK, Op. cit. supra note 19, at 21.
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suddenly become most heavily charged with issues and emotions-
the immense debt structure, under which farming struggles and
which, during this period of deflation and acute agricultural distress,
embraces the fair value of a substantial portion of the farms.2  It
21. See FARI IORTGAGE CREDIT Department of Agriculture (Technical Bul-
letin No. 288, 1932) by David L. Wickens, Agricultural Economist, Division of
Agricultural Finance.







The fixed annual charge on this debt in 1930 approximated $568,000,000.
Since 1930 the total debt has declined to about $8,500,000 according to approxi-
mations based in part on the fact that the total outstanding farm mortgage
loans by principal lenders-the Federal and the joint stock land banks and
40 important life insurance companies-declined about 8% from the begin-
ning of 1930 to September, 1932. The greater share of the debt reduction
no doubt was due to foreclosures.
Distressing as the situation is at present, it should be noted that 58% of
all farms in the United States are free of mortgage debt. The proportion of
each of four leading crops grown on mortgaged land in the U. S. is estimated
by M r. Wickens as follows: Corn--46.6 per cent; Wheat-50.1 per cent; Cotton
-- 42.8 per cent; Tobacco-31.7 per cent. Total, 4 crops-45.3 per cent. Pro-
portion for 75 crops--45.5 per cent.
The bulk of the present farm mortgage debt was incurred in years when
the general price level was about twice, and the level of farm prices nearly
four times as high as at the close of 1932. The creditor in most cases, there-
fore, lent about one-half the purchasing power now owed him.
Eric Englund, Assistant Chief of the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, estimates that the relationship of debt to value of land and buildings
in mortgaged farms was 47% in 1932. About 36% of mortgaged farms are
mortgaged for more than 50% of their present value, about 16% for more
than 75% of their sale value, and about 5% for more than 100% of their
sale value. The farms mortgaged for more than half of what they would
now bring on the market, number about 800,000 or slightly over 13% of the
6,000,000 farms in the U. S. It is in this group that most of the difficulty
in meeting mortgage payments has been experienced.
In addition to the mortgage debts, short-term loans to farmers from banks
approximate $2,000,000,000. Merchant credit, loans by individuals, and other
forms of indebtedness amount to more than $1,000,000,000.
Reports of changes in farm ownership between March, 1930, and March,
1931, indicate that 42% of all the transfers of farms were forced sales as
compared with 34% in each in the two preceding years. Data for 1931-32
are not yet available, but it is certain that the proportion of transfers that
are forced sales has been increasing steadily. Statements from the agri-
cultural colleges of nearly every state point out the seriousness of the farm
debt situation. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMTMITTEE OF THE AssocIATIoN
OF LAND-GRANT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIEs (November, 1932) 21.
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is this situation which has been brought before the eyes of the
nation by the foreclosure moratoria, the general insecurity of the
financial institutions concerned with farm credit, and the "holiday
boys" of the corn belt who have resorted to a miniature revolution
to retain their homes. During the past few years net returns have
been insufficient to pay the charges of mortgages. Foreclosures to
the amount of a billion dollars have occurred since 1929 and many
thousand farmers have been dispossessed or made tenants. Prac-
tically all mortgage loan agencies are now involved in salvaging
and liquidation. However, to a considerable extent farm foreclosures
have become inexpedient and a policy of forbearance has become
necessary. With the exception of the Federal Land Banks and a
limited number of banking agencies, all the sources of farm credit
have dried up. As an adventitious aspect of the farm situation, the
problem of debt, foreclosure and credit has been translated into the
most relevant eventuality with which the farmer and the credit
institutions of the country are faced.
Although in its dramatic consequences this problem of debts is
peculiar to the day, fundamentally it represents only the long-time
failure to effect a satisfactory rationalization of production. The
three years of crisis have only served to bring into startling relief
a farm mortgage situation that had been growing steadily into
threatening proportions ever since the war when the farmers essayed
the role of financier which initially bargained them into what has
turned out to be a perinanent state of debt. However, not only has
the meagre income of farming been insufficient to amortize the debts
undertaken in this peribd of feverish expansion and high prices, but
for the last decade farming as a losing business has been forced to
resort more and more to mortgaging its capital assets in order to
meet its everyday expenses of operation. On the diminishing volume
of income and wealth this expanding burden of debt has increasingly
pressed.
On the other hand, however, the problem of the debt structure
cannot be put to one side in the hope that by again placing farming
All in all, it appears certain that gross cash in the past two years has
fallen to a level so low that nearly all of it would be required to pay mortgage
charges and taxes on farms mortgaged at more than three-fourths of full
value. One thousand bushels of corn, which would have paid off $1,436 of
mortgage or interest in 1920, paid off only $120 in 1932. A thousand bushels
of wheat had fallen from $2,443 to $330. A thousand pounds of hogs, worth
$133.60 in 1920 now bring but $29. Instead of $89.90, a thousand pounds
of beef cattle now mean $39 or less. If an expert had selected the worst
possible time for many of these mortgages to fall due he could hardly have'
excelled the last two years.
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on a profitable basis other issues may be left to themselves. The
comforting assurance that the debt situation will be gradually
ameliorated by balancing output with consumption is hardly enough
for immediate need, particularly when there is no convincing evi-
dence that the story can be finished. By the same token, such a
program fails to take into account the critical requirements of that
other owner of American agriculture whose plight can no more
easily be rationalized-the banks, insurance companies, and invest-
ment houses. Both parties to the debt tie are equally unsatisfied,
and there must be a realistic balancing of interests and pressures.
The legal aspects of the matter under the caption of sanctity of
contract are involved enough. Prospectively, the forces of economic
rehabilitation seem most intimately geared to the conflicting demands
of the restoring of creditor-confidence and of the freeing of debtors
from obligations so burdensome as to mean virtual peasantry. -2
The only cheerful note that has been sounded in the whole piece
is the pious hope that the operation of economic laws" may be
trusted to restore agriculture to a state of balance in the general
industrial culture. However, in spite of the theories which have
lingered on from nineteenth century economics the period of agri-
cultural distress has dragged on from year to year until there is
no longer anything heroic in pointing out that, at least in agricul-
ture, the machinery upon which a competitive order depends for its
functioning, simply will not run. For as long as any cautious person
would care to estimate, the inability of farm production to accom-
modate itself to demand seems destined to remain a permanent
characteristic.
Economically speaking, agriculture is not an industrial organization
but a family craft which at the same time presents problems of fixed
investment and high overhead.2 The variable costs of production
are small; even labor costs do not vary with the yield. The "hands"
of the farm are the farmer and his household. If farming is using
more of human resources than is necessary, there is little possibility
of achieving economy by curtailing personnel. Consequently the
individual farmer has no way of reducing outlays to adjust himself
to a fall in prices. In fact a fall in prices which makes it difficult
for the farmer to make ends meet only causes him to work harder
and produce more. The "law" of supply and demand, if it can be
22. On the farm credit situation, see: BLACK, AGRICULTURAL REFoRM IN TEE
UNITED STATES (1929), c. XXI; ALEXANDER J. BOYAZOGLU, AcRicULDn4U
CRErr (1933), FRairA BAm, TEN YEARS OF FEDERAL INTERtEDIATE FAmu
CnRDIT (soon to be published).




said to work at all, has more than occasionally a tendency to work
in an inverse manner. The paramount question for the farmer is
not the costs per unit but the total amount and value of his crop,
and any one of the six million farmers has so negligible an in-
fluence on the general situation that the maintenance of price and
production policies by the individual is out of the question. In
industry producers are so large and few that to some extent they
can by their own efforts control their commodity. The biggest
producers may even xpect their smaller competitors to conform
to their prices. 24 Nor is the farm a business enterprise only. It is
also a home, and farming a mode of life. Consequently the "sub-
marginal producer" does not easily betake himself to searching out
new and strange paths of existence. Hoping against hope he stays
on awaiting better times.
Finally, American agriculture has no longer any chance to seek
readjustment by turning to foreign markets.25 Agricultural depression
is general in scope, at least so far as the western hemisphere is
concerned.26  The phenomena of unruly productive capacity, de-
structive surpluses, decreasing demand and low prices prevail every-
where. The struggle for foreign markets under existing conditions
is a hopeless one. No doubt our farmers may some day count on
the possibility of selling to China, India, and Japan. However, the
course of events offers no immediate hope for American agriculture
to include these countries in its planning except at impossibly low
prices or at a thoroughly disadvantageous level of exchange.
The Cooperative Movement
The farmer, traditionally an individualist, has made at best only
faint attempts to find an economic and legal basis for bringing his
house into order. Generally speaking, his efforts have amounted to
only a chapter of stumbling experiment in the cooperative marketing
of crops, frantically scribbled in the midst of falling prices. Still
this far from perfect machinery is the only instrument at present
protecting him from the full shock of economic disorder. The co-
24. Consider the influence which the United States Steel Corporation exerts
on the steel industry. See KEEZER AND MAY, Tim PUBLIC CoNTnoL Or BUSINEss
(1930).
25. High tariff barriers have been raised against products which we nor-
mally export. The tariff on wheat imports in Germany is $1.62 per bushel;
in France it is $.87 per bushel. Spain and Italy have barriers equally Insur-
mountable. Our exports of agricultural products have dropped from about
30% of our total farm production to about 10% of the total.
26. See note 19, supra.
[Vol. 42
PLANNING FOR AGRICULTURE
operative rationalization of production has never commanded his
support or sympathy. Indeed, since the cooperative movement cuts
athwart the law designed to protect competition, even his efforts at
organized marketing would for the most part have been ill-advised
had it not been for the tolerance and sympathy of the courts and the
ready responsiveness of the legislature. The legal problems involved
in the cooperative movement are not simple. It must not constitute
a device to control prices or production in contravention of statute
and the common law. However, in certain directions the decisions
have been able to fortify the scattered efforts of farmers to con-
solidate their economic strength,2 7 while the state legislatures, in
the hope that the cooperative movement may substantially overcome
the hardships with which the farmers contend, have gone far beyond
the courts.
It seems clear that cooperative associations are now safe from
prosecution as constituting per se restrictions of trade. Here, as
in other instances, the path of the courts has been made easy by
statutes adopted in most of the states providing that an association
organized under the acts ". . . shall be deemed not to be a con-
spiracy nor a combination in restraint of trade nor an illegal
monopoly; nor an attempt to lessen competition or to fix prices ar-
bitrarily or to create a combination or pool, in violation of any law of
this State; ..." 218 There are also further provisions that the market-
ing contracts and agreements between the association and its
members and any agreements authorized in the act shall not be
considered to be illegal or in restraint of trade or contrary to the
provisions of any statute enacted against pooling or combinations.
The congressional exemptions in the Clayton and Capper-Volstead
acts of agricultural cooperative organizations from prosecution under
the federal anti-trust laws have not yet been tested in a case before
the United States Supreme Court, and it is possible that the ex-
emptions may be whittled away as has happened in the instance of
27. See generally on the legal status of cooperatives: Hamilton, Judieial
Tolerance of Farmers' Cooperatives (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 936; Tobriner, Tho
Constitutionality of the Cooperative Marketing Statutes (192) 17 CALLW. L.
R-y. 19; Keegan, Power of Agricultural Cooperative Associations to Limit
Production (1928) 26 MIcH. L. REV. 648; Mleyer, The Law of Cooperativo
Marketing (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 85; Sapiro, The Law of Cooperativo
Marketing Associations (1926) 15 KY. L. J. 1; NOURSE, THE LE(Ax, STxrUs
OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION (1927); MONTGOMERY, THE COOPERATIVE PAT-
TERN IN AGRICULTURE (1929). For a thorough study of the history of the
whole cooperative movement see STEEN, COOPERATIVE MARKETING (1923). On
the general subject of guild socialism, see S. G. HOBsoN, NATIONA, GUuLDS
AND THE STATE (1920); A. J. PENTY, POST-INnUSTRLxISt (1922).
28. KY. ACTS (1922) c. 1, § 28.
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
labor organizations., Yet the general attitude of the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court indicates a more friendly disposition towards
the farmer than has been manifested towards labor.2
Statutes have also provided for the enforcement of membership
contracts by injunction and specific performance and by the recovery
of liquidated damages for breach, and severe penalties both civil
and criminal are to be imposed upon outsiders who attempt to
interfere with the performance of these contracts. It has been con-
sistently held that these provisions, in relation to farmer's associations
lawfully engaged in cooperative marketing simply, do not impinge
upon either the state or national anti-trust laws, and consequently
are not offensive to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result the marketing acts are functioning side by
side with the anti-trust acts without friction.30
On the other hand there are limits of forbearance beyond which
the cooperatives dare not go. Although the associations have a
large amount of discretion with respect to how .the agricultural
29. Contrast the early unfriendly disposition as expressed in the case of
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902), with the more recent
case of Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative
Marketing Association, 276 U. S. 71 (1928). In this case the Supreme Court
in holding valid a Kentucky statute which gave certain exemptions to agri-
cultural cooperatives, said, p. 96: "The opinion generally accepted-and upon
reasonable grounds, we think-is that cooperative marketing statutes promote
the common interest." See, however, Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278
U. S. 515 (1929).
30. In Clear Lake Co-op. Live Stock Shippers' Association v. Weir, 200
Iowa 1293, 1301, 206 N. W. 292, 300 (1925) the court held that, " . . . a mere
selling agency is not, per se, a monopoly." In Northern Wisconsin Co-operative
Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 593, 197 N. W. 945, 936 (1924) the
court stated that the marketing acts could be reconciled with the anti-trust
acts as a reasonable classification, for " . . . the legislature may classify such
agreements, condemning some and authorizing others, if there are reasonable
and proper economic, political, and social reasons for making the classification,"
In Tobacco Growers Co-operative Association v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265, 273, 117
S. E. 174, 178 (1923) the court held that the Cooperative Marketing Act,
. . . does not empower those who produce the raw material to create a
monopoly in themselves." Of course the marketing acts, since they are the
later acts, would, if held repugnant to the state anti-trust acts, have the effect
of repealing them. However, all of the decisions have been able to effect a
reconciliation. See also Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association v.
Dunn, 150 Tenn. 614, 266 S. W. 308 (1924); Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers'
Co-operative Association, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923); Louisiana Farm
Bureau Cotton Growers' Co-operative Association v. Clark, 160 La. 294, 107
So. 115 (1926); Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers'
Cooperative Marketing Association, supra note 29. But compare Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., supra note 29, which is generally thought to be dis-
tinguishable. When restrictions on production are concerned see infra, note 34.
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products handled by them shall be marketed, still they may not
unduly enhance the price of their commodities either by attempting
to manipulate the market or by fixing a price unreasonably high.3'
The Courts have more than occasionally gone out of their way to
caution against such activities. 32 Also a cooperative association may
not enter into agreements with its members restricting the production
of agricultural products. Section 6 of the Clayton Act and the
Capper-Volstead Act contain no provisions which in any way author-
ize such action, 33 nor do the cooperative marketing acts of the
various states expressly grant to the association the right to attempt
such regulation with their members. For the courts to discover the
grant of such a right they would have to do so by rather far-fetched
implication from some of the general language in the acts, and as
yet they have been far from evidencing any such inclination. Whether,
even if authorized by legislation, contracts between cooperatives and
their members directed towards this end would be held valid in
the face of the Fourteenth amendment, is not altogether certain.
The word "liberty" in the due process clause has been variously
defined by the courts. Restrictive covenants on the sale of a business
or in connection with the relationship of master and servant have
been upheld within certain limits. But a man cannot barter away
his personal freedom, and the courts have often said that the right
to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable
right, and no contract contrary to that end can be valid even though
it has the sanction of the legislature.34 In the absence of legislative
31. People v. Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y. 267, 39 N. E. 1062 (1895); Owen
County Burley Tobacco Society v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 107 S. W. 710
(1908); Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association v. Mason, 150 Tenn.
228, 263 S. W. 60 (1923); List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Aszo-
ciation, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N. E. 471 (1926). See also United States v.
Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392 (1927), where the Supreme Court held that
an agreement among competitors as to the prices to be charged for the articles
manufactured by them in and of itself constituted a violation of the Sherman
Act regardless of the prices named.
32. See Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 1, and cases cited therein.
33. The Capper Volstead Act expressly applies only to agricultural products
already produced. It does not apply to production.
34. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Oregon Growers' Co-operative
Association v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561, 212 Pac. 811 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239
U. S. 33 (1915) ; cf. the case of the laborer who resumes work during a strike
in contravention of the orders of the union to which he has agreed, Brennan
v. United Hatters of North America, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 AtI. 165 (1906).
See Warren, The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth A-z cdmcnt (1926)
39 HAnv. L. REv. 431; and Kales, Contracts to Refrain from Doing Busincza
or from Entering or Carrying on an Occupation (1917) 31 HAMv. L. REv. 190.
Even if such a statute should be held valid it might then have the consequence
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sanction contracts which have for their purpose the control of
production have always been held void both at common law and under
the anti-trust acts and the association responsible for them has been
declared illegal as a combination in restraint of trade. No appellate
court has yet directly considered such a contract in connection with
a farmer's cooperative,35 but in several instances the courts have
issued plain warning that it cannot be done,30 and in cases involving
charges that cooperatives were monopolies operating in restraint of
trade, it was deemed necessary to point out that the associations had
not attempted to limit or reduce production. 37 Indeed it is not al-
together clear that even advice may be given regarding the
of repealing state anti-trust laws in toto as a consequence of the equal pro-
tection of the laws. However, this consequence might not be very serious in
view of the extensive field of operation of the federal anti-trust laws, Se
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., supra note 29; Beatrice Creamery Co. v.
Cline, 9 F. (2d) 176 (D. Colo. 1925). See also the remarks of the court in
Dark Tobacco Growers' Association v. Dunn, supra note 30, an(( New State 1eo
Co. v. Liebman, supra note 1. Several state constitutions contain declarations
against any form of monopoly. The following cases, however, declare in
sweeping terms that a classification of farmers as distinct from other classes
is perfectly reasonable: Kansas Wheat Growers Association v. Schulte, 113
Kan. 672, 216 Pac. 311 (1923); Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Association, 246
S. W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Clear Lake Cooperative Livestock Shippers'
Association v. Weir, supra note 30; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco
Growers' Cooperative Association, supra note 29; Rifle Potato Growers' Asso-
ciation v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925); cf. also Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 (1922); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana,
179 U. S. 89 (1900). See Tobriner, supra note 27; Note (1926) 4 TEx. L.
R-y. 382; Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 400.
35. There has been no case presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States involving a cooperative marketing association in which this specific
question has been raised, but there are many cases involving commercial
organizations which have been prosecuted under the Sherman Anti-trust Act
in which the federal courts have held that agreements entered into by com-
petitors engaged in interstate commerce operating to limit or restrict produc-
tion violated that act. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U. S. 211 (1899); U. S. v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 F. 502 (1915); Gibbs
v. McNeeley, 118 Fed. 120 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902); Contrast English law, English
Hop Growers v. Deering, [1928] 2 K. B. 174, in which liquidated damages
were awarded for breach of a contract to restrict production of hops.
36. Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 18 Pac.
391, 9 Am. St. Rep. 211 (1888); Cravens v. Carter-Crume Co., 92 Fed. 470
(C. C. A. 6th, 1899); List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association,
supra note 31; Washington Cranberry Growers' Association v. Moore, 11
Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773 (1921). A Colorado trial court has held such a
provision void.
37. List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Ass'n, supra note 31; Lee
et al. v. Clearwater 'Growers' Association, 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927);
Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Association v. Jones, supra note 30.
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advisability of reducing the acreage of a particular agricultural
product.38 The act of Congress which created the division of co-
operative marketing in the Department of Agriculture contains a
provision which specifically authorizes farmers and their associations
to exchange information and interpretations thereof concerning
production and marketing. A state supreme court has held that an
association may advise its members to grow less tobacco and to
employ their land in the production of alfalfa.39 The court likened
this action to suggestions which have been given by the Department of
Agriculture.40
Even if the existing legal obstacles could be more or less success-
fully hurdled, it is far from certain that a satisfactory reorganization
through cooperative associations could be projected. The practical
difficulties, in view of the institutional pattern of agriculture, are
manifold, and nothing short of such an at present chimerical project
as compulsory pooling would be, perhaps, at all adequate. The
control of production by voluntary agreements would involve a vast
network of tangled and difficult relationships. The situation is
much more complicated than even that which existed in our banking
before the adoption of the Federal Reserve Act, when we had a
decentralized system of over 30,000 individual banking units with
unorganized reserves and subject to periodic collapses. A coordinated
policy vas impossible in view of the conflicts which existed between
a sound national banking policy and what might be profitable to the
particular banks.
In business and industry the value of association has been realized
for a long time. Manufacturing corporations have made voluntary
action effective even under the shadow of the anti-trust laws. How-
ever, their structure is very different from anything to be found in
38. Before two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
1924 in cases concerning trade associations, it was not even certain that those
pursuing the same industry could exchange information with regard to matters
of common interest. Cement Manufacturers' Association v. United States,
268 U. S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association v. United
States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925).
39. List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Association, supra note 31.
40. The basic rating and surplus price plans used by cooperative milk
marketing associations may have the indirect consequence of reducing or limit-
ing production. However, there is no direct restriction on production since
the members may produce as much milk as they wish, but the amount for which
they will be paid on a fluid milk basis is restricted. Up to the present time
the courts have not specifically considered the right of an association to control
the marketing of milk under such a plan. The associations have come into
courts a number of times, but in no case has the legality of their marketing
projects been directly considered.
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farming.41 The producing units which include also the marketing
units are large and relatively few and they are pitted against many
small buyers. Consequently a strong esprit de corps is not difficult
to be achieved among the various concerns in any particular field,
and there is also the simple instrument of consolidation. Demand
can be made to respond to the stimulation of reduction in price,
clever salesmanship and high-pressure advertising, and an easy
ability to adjust supply to the market exists. The growing of crops,
on the contrary, is a petty trade in which many are engaged,
while the purchasers are large and few. Capacity to produce is too
stubborn to be ruled by market requirements, and lowering of the
price level does not eliminate the unnecessary sub-marginal under-
takings. The easy facilities for entering the field invite newcomers
whenever prices rise or other industries release surplus labor. The
individual farmer has no reserves or specialized business advice to
permit him to plan shrewdly for the future and at best his manage-
ment is a hand-to-mouth affair. As in labor unions "scabs" are
always .an actual or potential source of danger to the functioning of
the cooperatives. The "enlightened self-interest" of individual
farmers does not always indicate that they should sustain the burdens
as well as enjoy the advantages of organization. The cooperative pat-
tern is opposed to all the traditions of farmers. Widely scattered as
they are and cherishing a vaunted independence, it requires a very evil
day to make of the individual a loyal supporter of the association,
and he is only too ready to free himself from the group when he can
see a chance for himself. The part of the ,minion has been far from
heroic.
On the other hand, however, the mere fact that the counters with
which the cooperative movement has gone to the tables have so far
proved inadequate to beat the game is far from conclusive. Possibly
the cooperatives may devise a new system of play or the legislature
and the courts may give them more counters. One thing no doubt
is clear, the cooperatives cannot hope to control production by the
weapons of persuasion and the gentlemen's agreement which man-
ufacturing organizations have used so successfully, and which is at
pres.ent all that the law allows. In his occasional role of business
man the farmer has proved himself too indifferent.
If in the cooperative movement is to be found a greater solution
to the problems which assail the farmer, some prerogative right
41. For the suggestion that the solution to the farmers' problems lies in
the reorganization of the producing unit along the lines which industry has
followed in recent years rather than in legislative readjustments, see KILE,
THE Nuw AGRICULTURE (1932); Johnson, Relief from Farm Relief (Autumn,
1932) YALE REviEw 52.
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must be bestowed upon it. A single cooperative marketing enterprise
for each crop which should be given by the legislatures the power to
enter into reasonable contracts .with its members for limiting or
reducing production, enforceable by injunction and by liquidated
damages for breach,4 2 might win the day. However, in view of the
wide-spread free-lancing which has played such havoc with all the
more ambitious attempts of the cooperative movement, such an
-association will have to be given special railroad rates in the market-
ing of produce or some other generous mark of financial favor so
that it would attract a sufficiently inclusive membership. 3 Finally,
as far as the legal issues are concerned, an additional measure of
judicial tolerance would need to be counted on.44
The Direct Regulation of Prices and Production
The legal and political problems raised by the cooperative move-
ment are almost insignificant in comparison with a program
involving the direct regulation of prices and production by the
government. Politically, farming has always been looked on as
something with which the government should not directly concern
itself. The arguments are so persuasive that usually it is not con-
sidered necessary even to mention them. The government may
render incidental assistance to the farmer, but it must not enter the
realm sacred to private direction.4 5 This vague and exalted attitude
of mind has been giving way before the slow onslaught of constant
maladjustment and the sudden shock of the depression. We have
already witnessed the unhappy experimental efforts of the Farm
Board, created by the late Republican administration, to stabilize
agriculture by buying up the surplus. However, not only was the
surplus too large for the Farm Board to take over but also there
was nothing that the Farm Board could do with it, not even dump
it abroad. The surplus remained almost as destructive a force in the
domestic market as it had been in private ownership. A number of
42. Such measures have already been legalized in the enforcement of mem-
bership contracts for marketing. The decisions of the courts indicate that
these measures are no unfair classification in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and so leave the anti-trust laws unaffected. See note 30, supra.
43. Consider also the same project involving compulsory pooling, now
politically and constitutionally impossible.
44. See notes 32, 34, supra.
45. England, for example, as does most other European countries, guaran-
tees the price of many food products. However, the problem of the European
countries is that of attaining self-sufficiency, not that of a surplus. Conse-
quently their price-fixing legislation is designed expressly to encourage pro-
duction. See BEVERID E, BRITISH FOOD CONTROL (1928).
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other proposals have been more or less seriously considered by
Congress in recent years, such as the McNary-Haugen (the equali-
zation fee) and the export debenture bills. The philosophy behind
these projects has been to devise a system of giving a tariff benefit
to farmers, and thus equiparate their position to that of manufac-
turers. The process of equiparation would be accomplished by means
of a bounty.46 Among other objections against them, it was urged
that the bounties would encourage farmers to increase production
with the result that prices would fall and the situation would be
even worse than before. Whether this would have been true or not,
at least all of the proposals would have involved dumping surplus
crops abroad. No doubt this would have led sooner or later to the
levying by foreign countries of an anti-dumping tax against our
exports. And in any event the Farm Board experiment has taught
us that it is simply no longer possible to dump surpluses. The utter
failure of these cautious attempts to apply an anaesthetic to farming
has finally created a strong sentiment in the agricultural districts
demanding that the legislature undertake the fixing of a minimum
price and that the -United States fall in line with the European
countries which have already assumed this function.47
Legally, a frontal attack by direct government regulation would
mean conflict with the conventional notions of "industries affected
with a public interest." The Supreme Court has recited time and
time again, but by way of dicta only, that ". . . at least in the
absence of grave emergency, . . . the fixing of prices for food or
clothing . . . whether minimum or maximum, is beyond the
46. The equalization fee plan provided for marketing agreements with
cooperative associations, or corporations created and controlled by them, by
which they would hold part of the commodity off the market during a specified
period, costs to be paid out of a stabilization fund. This fund would be built
up through the proceeds of an equalization fee assessed by the board on each
marketed unit of the commodity, to be paid on the transportation, processing,
or sale of such unit. The export debenture method of price control provided
for issuance of debentures by the Secretary of the Treasury to exporters of
the commodities affected in an amount equivalent to one-half the rate of duty
on imports of such commodities. Export debentures would be receivable at
their face value in payment of import duties or might be redeemed at a slight
discount by the Secretary of the Treasury.
47. See the proposals of Senator McAdoo and former Senator Brookhart
which have been indorsed by a number of farming organizations. Senator
McAdoo has prepared a bill providing for the fixing of minimum prices for
a number of agricultural products which he has announced that he intends
to introduce in the present Congress. To avoid any difficulty with inter and
intra state commerce classifications the proposals contemplate also the legis-
lative cooperation of the various agricultural states.
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legislative power." 48 However, judicial responses to questions which
have not been framed, like shouting in an unexplored canyon, in-
dicate very little of the contours and figurations which lie ahead.
These responses have all been based on the assumption that the
natural market, blessed by the invocation of laws against trusts,
monopolies, conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade,
determined price and production to the greatest well-being of buyer,
seller and the community at large. But let that assumption be
challenged by the Legislature in a time of falling business and when
it is recognized that natural economic forces may work disorder and
disaster, and the question would need to be approached not as a
matter of past attitude but as an aspect of a necessarily new public
policy. No doubt it would be no light task to convince all the members
of the Supreme Court that the structure of industry according to
law is something of a castle in the air. But a strong minority has
already indicated that it is convinced and enough others have not
yet said that they are not open to conviction.
Affectation with public interest has proven itself before now to
be a highly receptive concept and one which permits of graceful
accommodation to whatever new attitude the court may bring to its
problems. In the minds of the majority of the judges at the present
time there is back of the phrase a sharp cleavage between two
radically different orders of being which divide industries between
them and leave no other possibilities with which to conjure: the
competitive and those where for one reason or another competition
does not work freely and so does not give to buyers and sellers the
protection which their interests require. In the competitive order,
restraint of price, "the heart of the contract," is unnatural, a viola-
tion of economic laws and sure to do more harm than good.40
However, this easy dichotomy of a vast interlocking industrial
culture which hardly antedates the century has been fixed and hard
in Supreme Court decisions for not more than a decade. In the
process of analysis the Court took no notice of the presence of very
great maladjustment, interdependent industries, the intricate prob-
48. Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 1, at 357. See note 2, supra. Valuable
recent discussions on legislative price fixing are Powell, State Utilities and the
Supreme Court 1922-1930 (1931) 29 MICH. L. REv. 811; Hamilton, Affectation
with Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1089; McAllister, Lord Hale and
Business Affected with a Public Interest (1930) 43 HAMv. L. REv. 759.
49. During the Revolution eight of the thirteen states passed statutes faxing
the price of most commodities. See Note (1920) 33 HAnv. L. REV. 838. And
for many years after that the price of bread was regulated by statute in
South Carolina and Maryland. 5 STAT. OF S. C. 186 (1791); S. C. Acrs oF
AssmmLY, 1791-1794, p. 88; ID. LAWs (1789) c. 8, § 2, H ian's DIGzS' OF
THE LAWS OF MARYLAND (1799) 250.
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lem of unruly capacity for supply, "producer's disadvantage" (not
less important for the community than "consumer's disadvantage"),
and it was not faced with the task of salvaging industrial wreckage
from a depression which is a gigantic commentary on the failure to.
bring supply and demand to equality- The endless variation of
business structure and control do not allow of the sublime simplicity
of a rule of two. Indeed, in the agony of conflict with the realistic
situations in which it has attempted to project the, doctrine, the
Court has not only confessed to bewilderment, but has almost pre-
sented it in the phraseology of a riddle, the answer to which its,
propounder does not know. 0 Affectation with public interest is
now an established category of fact but any attempt at analysis
would be futile. It is not difficult to sympathize with Mr. Justice
Holmes who rejects the concept as "little more than a fiction." 0
That farming is not a natural monopoly is no doubt clearer than,
the contrary; therefore in the casual thoughts bestowed upon farm-
ing by the Court it has consistently been put in the category of
industries subject only to regulation for the maintenance of the
competitive market. No one can conjecture what weight the Court
is now ready to give to the evidence that agriculture is sui generis,
to be defined, if definition is wanted, as an instance of "producer's
disadvantage" where competitive conditions cannot be depended upon
to establish rightful prices for farm products or to limit production
in accord with maximum economy. Whether or not it is too late to
substitute for the doctrine of "public interest" as the test for price-
fdxing,5 2 the pragmatic suggestion of Mr. Justice Stone in Tyson V.
Banton 3 is not conclusive, for the classification of industries af-
50. See Mr. Justice Sutherland in Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 1 at 355.
"Is the business one 'affected with a public interest', within the meaning of
that phrase as heretofore defined by this court? As was recently pointed out
in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton. . . . the phrase is not capable of exact definition;
but, nevertheless, under all the decisions of this court from Munn v. Illinois,
.. it is the standard by which the validity of price-fixing legislation, in
respect of a business like this here under consideration must be tested." Of.
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 239. Mr. Justice McKenna im
German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 406 finally said:
"We can best explain by examples." See also Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 1.
51. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra note 1.
52. For a suggestion that affectation with public interest is not the con-
clusive test for price fixing, consider carefully Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930), where Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke for
a unanimous court, and O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
282 U. S. 251 (1931).
53. "An examination of the decisions of this court in which price regula-
tion has been upheld will disclose that the element common to all is the existencce
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fected with a public interest has not yet been finally made, and in
any event the application of a principle that has been written can
be made less automatic.5 A rule which so far has been applied
chiefly to the appendages of other businesses may take on a distinctive
form when considered in relation to an immense basic industry.
Nor might the Supreme Court care to assume the momentous re-
sponsibility of vetoing a legislative act of more than ordinary
importance, and to undertake itself in the isolation of the legal
cloister the fashioning of rules for what has been proclaimed by the
Legislature as the coming of a new order. If the Court did not care
to go too deeply into the stuff of its mysterious creation, an easy
as well as persuasive way out is at hand with the assistance of the
word "emergency." 5
In a completed form the mechanics of a scheme for price-fixing
would be, if anything, more complicated than those involved in an
effective reorganization of the cooperative movement. Obviously
a minimum price could only be established for the share to be sold in
the domestic market. Consequently in those instances where over-
production is possible the government would need to fix the amount
of a situation or a combination of circumstances materially restricting the
regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at such
a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that serious economic consequences
result to a very large number of members of the community." Supra note 1,
at 452. See also the dissent of Mr. Justice Stone in Ribnik v. McBride, mspra
note 1, at 359: "Under the decisions of this court not all price regulation, as
distinguished from other forms of regulation, is forbidden. ... As I read
those decisions, such regulation is within a state's power whenever any com-
bination of circumstances seriously curtails the regulative force of compe-
tition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the
bargaining, struggle that a legislature might reasonably anticipate serious con-
sequences to the community as a whole."
54. Mr. Justice Brandeis in his elaborate dissent in the New State Tca
Company case said (285 U. S. at 302-303): "In my opinion, the true principle
is that the state's power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably
required and appropriate for the public protection. I find in the due process
clause no other limitation upon the character or the scope of regulation per-
missible."
55. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921) where a rent law, passed as a
war measure was held constitutional; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917)
where the Adamson act giving to certain railroad employees an eight hour
wage equivalent to their previous ten hour wage was held valid on the ground
(inter alia) of an emergency. In the New State Ice Company case Mr. Justice
Brandeis said (285 U. S. at 306): "The people of the United States are now
confronted with an emergency more serious than war. Misery is widespread,
in a time, not of scarcity, but of overabundance. The long-continued depression
has brought unprecedented unemployment, a catastrophic fall in commodity




of produce which is to be consumed domestically. 0 Consequently
also, in order to insure that every farmer would have a chance to
participate in the benefits of the fixed price, the government would
need to issue to individual farmers quotas for the amount of produce
which each might place on the domestic market. The elimination of
the related evils of low prices, destructive surpluses and wasteful
overproduction would be adequately contemplated and no doubt with
proper administration could be sufficiently achieved.
Whether or not, however, the sacrifice of flexibility and of all
natural economic forces should be allowed to weigh heavily against
the attempt to control agriculture directly by legislative action is a
formidable question. The necessity of a unified control and general
oversight for farming is great, but to what extent is it advisable to
have particular decisions left to those most closely concerned?
Simplicity and flexibility, the absence of an over-complex mechanism,
the avoidance of police supervision, and the linking up of the general
end with immediate individual interest are elements which are not
often prominent in plans for close government supervision. Would
a more circuitous type of regulation like that for example introduced
to American law by the Federal Reserve Act 57 be preferable to such
a direct control as is represented by the activities of the Interstate
Commerce Commission? This issue describes in part the process of
creation of another proposal.
Control of Production by Means of the Taxing and Spending Powers
of Congress
A second type of proposal for farm relief which like direct govern-
mental regulation is hopeful of bringing permanent order into the
56. In a special report on legislative recommendations, supplementing its
third annual report to Congress, the Federal Farm Board held that the fol-
lowing principle had been demonstrated by experience to be essential for
effective relief: "Prices cannot be kept at fair levels unless production is ad-
justed to meet market demands. . . . Any method which provided higher
prices and did.not include effective regulation of acreage or of quantities sold,
or both, would tend to increase the present surpluses and soon break down as
a result. To be of lasting help, any plan must provide a system of effective
regulation, so that our millions of farmers can plan and adjust their produc-
tion on a dependable basis, instead of competing blindly with each other."
57. Standards in the Federal Reserve System are maintained by the persuasion
and constraint of rediscount and open market policies upon member banks,
and not to any great extent by directly enforceable duties. Ever since its
existence the act has been suggestive of an easy control with very little direct
interference which might with necessary modifications be used for other enter-
prises. See WESTERFIELD, BANKING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1928).
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affairs of agriculture is the Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan. s
Its distinguishing characteristic, marking it as a radical departure
from the equalization fee and the export debenture schemes,52 is
that it intends to pay the farmer a bounty on produce sold in the
domestic market on the condition that he voluntarily reduce acreage,
thus regulating both price and production. For this reason it repre-
sents a plan which if practical and effectively managed could be
made to counteract the ills of the present situation. The bounty is
to be collected by an excise tax on the processing of that part of the
products which is consumed in the United States and is to be paid
over to those farmers who voluntarily limit their acreage in accord-
ance with the plan. Acreage quotas for individual farmers would
be based on their average crop over a period of years. The tax and
bounty are to be adjusted so as to make the price received by the
farmers as valuable relative to all other goods as it was before the
war.60
Under this plan production would be controlled not by direct
sanction but by financial inducement. If a farmer chafed at the
restraints imposed the only penalty for non-adherence to the desig-
nated quota would be sacrifice of the bounty. If he conceived, from
the complexion of the market, that effective demand for his crop
would make profitable more extensive production, individual judg-
ment not governmental edict would be the final arbiter. Whether
this potential (and perhaps hypothetical) flexibility would be eco-
nomically desirable or whether its actual realization would in
considerable measure thwart the larger objectives is an issue which
has borne much argument.' In any case the practical desirability
of the allotment plan depends in large measure upon this two-edged
prerogative of individual initiative and liberty of action.
58. The Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan has had a number of changes
and modifications since its inception. In its latest available forms it has been
known as the Norbeck-Hope Bill (SEN. REP. No. 4985, 72d Cong. 1st Sezs.,
and H. R. REP. No. 12918, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.), the Knight Bill and the Jones
Bill (H. R. REP. No. 13399, 72d Cong. 2d Sess.) which was passed by the House
January 12, 1933. The original plan seems to have been a composite of plans
devised by the late Walter J. Spillman, Professor John D. Black of Harvard,
and Professor M. L. Wilson of the Montana State College. Most of the dis-
cussions of its applications concerned cotton, wheat, hogs, rice and tobacco.
The scheme of the plan is generally conceded to conform more nearly than any
other to the sLx points laid down by Governor Roosevelt in his Topeca speech.
59. See note 46, supra.
60. Many friends of the measure are willing to admit that pre-war condi-
tions present no "scientific principle" by which the amount of the tax should be
determined, but rather that it should be estimated by economists on the basis
of general conditions today and the actual needs of farmers.
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The reason, however, for the incorporation of this particular type
of regulation in the allotment plan represents also an attempt to
avoid the Constitutional difficulties involved in the fixing of prices
and production by the government. The taxing clause has often
proved to be an effective means to a variety of ends, and the enact-
ment of taxes and duties for purposes in fact alien to the financing
of the government is now regarded as an orthodox feature of the
law. Nevertheless two constitutional problems, are suggested by the
allotment plan: (1) whether the tax levied is actually a tax or a
regulatory police measure; (2) whether a federal tax may be levied
or appropriations made by Congress from the general revenue for
the purpose of a bounty to the farmers.
The grant of the national taxing power is contained in article I,
section VIII, clause 1: "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imports, and excises, to pay the debts, and
provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imports, and excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States." It is, characteristic of the constitutional delega-
tions to Congress, so uncertain and ambiguous that when it must
be charted there is likely to enter into the result a measure of personal
preference. Along with the postal power and the war power it has
a more generous sweep than the usual federal powers and it is not
so intimately concerned with the question of what is sacred to the
domain of the state.0 '
In 1922 the Supreme Court, departing from what had seemed to
be the previous doctrine,02 held that it could look through the form
of a taxing statute if it was apparent on its very face that it was not
intended for purposes of revenue but for purposes of regulation.0 3 An
61. The war powers pay little respect to nice problems of state and national
control. Excise taxes and the strongly progressive rates of the national estate
and income taxes may influence rights which are exclusively within the direcb
control of the states.
62. Before the Child Labor Tax Case and Hill v. Wallace there was much
authority for the proposition that the court could not search out the motive or
purpose of Congress in imposing an excise tax. In re Kolloch, 165 U. S, 526
(1897); McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904); United States v. Dore-
mus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
63. The Child Labor Tax case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S.
20 (1922)) held unconstitutional a federal statute which levied an annual
excise tax equivalent to 10% of the entire net profits on every person "using
child labor" in a mine or manufacturing establishment for more than eight
hours a day or six days a week or before the hour of six o'clock ante mnridian
during any part of the taxable year. In Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922)
a federal tax was also held unconstitutional. The act in question imposed a tax
of 20 cents a bushel on all contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery,
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excise tax that is in point of fact a measure of regulation may be
invalidated if it is not limited to interstate or foreign commerce.
However, if it should be held that a taxing statute is in substance
and truth an exercise of the taxing power, whatever incidental
effects it may have towards the regulation or suppression of business
enterprises is immaterial.
Thus we start with the proposition that what is in form a tax may
be a police regulation so alien to any purpose of financing the national
government as to be outside the taxing power vested in Congress.
The Constitution does not bestow on Congress complete power of
regulating anything it wishes provided only that it enforces its
behests by threatening to tax violators. However, the tax on pro-
cessors proposed in the allotment bill is, if considered alone, obviously
a fiscal and not a regulatory enterprise. The tax itself contemplates
the raising of money and not the regulation of the processing busi-
ness. There is no difficulty in distinguishing Hill v. Wallace and the
Child Labor Tax case.64 A penalty is not being imposed on processors
for departures from conduct prescribed for their industry. On the
other hand an unsympathetic court could, without any great difficulty,
largely extend the principle of those decisions to invalidate taxing
statutes which contemplate police regulation not by the tax itself
but by the funds to be derived from the tax.5
but excepted sales on boards of trade designated as contract markets by the
Secretary of Agriculture, on the fulfillment by such boards of certain require-
ments set forth in the act.
64. For a discussion of some further issues which might be involved, see
note 90, infra.
65. It is submitted, however, that this reasoning would be unsound logically.
It should be observed that no question arises of interference with the rights of
the states reserved by the Tenth Amendment. That amendment, although it
may have some political significance, sets up no criterion for deciding as to
whether or not a power has been given to Congress. It must be established
independently of the Tenth Amendment that the constitution does not give the
power to the federal government. But see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
251 (1918); Child Labor Tax case, supra note 63; Hill v. Wallace, supra note 63.
Of course in any event it could hardly be argued that this is an interference
with the Police Power of the States since under the Police Power the states
have no right to regulate the production or price of food or clothing. A clearly
prohibitive tax might possibly be held invalid under the due process clause.
"However, no federal tax has thus far been held to be a violation of the Fifth
Amendment and there are several intimations in the opinions of the Supreme
Court that the Fifth Amendment does not limit the taxing power of Congress.
These, however, are offset to a degree by the recognition that a so-called tax
may be so atrociously outrageous as not to be a tax but an arbitrary exaction.
Thus the situation seems to be that the Fifth Amendment does not limit the
federal taxing power as the Fourteenth Amendment limits the taxing power
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This fact that the proceeds of the tax are designed not for the
administration but for the farmer, that the defeat of the bill would
score the farm bloc, not the financiers of the government, raises also
the second question: What are the purposes for which Congress
may raise money by levying an excise tax? 6 The clause in article
I, Section VIII provides that Congress may levy taxes "to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of
the United States." How is the power to appropriate affected by
the sweeping term "to provide for the general welfare"? Can
Congress exercise its power to levy a tax for a specific purpose (or
to make appropriations from the general fund) only in furtherance
of its exercise of powers otherwise enumerated, or is the permissible
disposition of governmental revenue unrestricted save by the literal
meaning of "the general welfare"? 61
This resurrects a constitutional question which once concerned
mightily our earlier statesmen and was elaborated in ways that now
often seem labored and imaginative. Strangely enough the Supreme
Court has never rendered a decision on the point. The question has
simply never been directly considered. The verdict must be drawn
from the practice of Congress, the opinions of men in public station
and commentators on the Constitution, the persuasion of some dubi-
ous dicta, and such arguments of syntax, logic, history Ind policy
as may influence the Court.
The issue has generally arisen with reference to the power of
Congress to provide for internal improvements, although after the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions it became involved for a time
with the general doctrine of State's rights. Hamilton and Madison
had earlier traced the issue in the Federalist, Hamilton contending
of the states, but that there is still a limit of reasonableness beyond which
Congress may not go." (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 68, n. 27.
66. In considering an issue of constitutionality a court must not go beyond
inference drawn from the statute itself. This seems to be the doctrine laid
down in McCray v. United States, supra note 62, as interpreted by the Child
Labor Tax case, supra note 63. See also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, supra note 62.
This consideration, however, hardly arises in the Allotment bills proposed thus
far, since all of them include the tax and the appropriation in the same measure.
If, however, the tax and the appropriation were made separate pieces of
legislation as is proposed in the program for farm relief placed before Congress
by the president (discussed infra), could the processors attack the validity of
the tax as being a regulatory measure? All of the authorities apparently
hold that they could not.
67. For the contention that the spending power of congress is unrestricted
by virtue of the effect of the "general welfare" clause see Corwin, the Spending
Power of Congress (1923) 36 HARe. L. Ray. 548. On federal subsidies to the




for the broader interpretation 6- and Madison holding that the general
welfare clause is limited by the other powers of Congress. In
1791 in his Report on Manufactures 70 Hamilton restated his position
and argued that "the only qualification of the generality of the
phrase in question which seems to be admissible, is this, that the
object to which an appropriation of money is to be made must be
general and not local-its operation extending in fact, or by pos-
sibility, throughout the union, and not being confined to a particular
spot." In general the presidents from the time of Monroe on seem
to have accepted the views of Hamilton except during the period
immediately before the Civil War when state's rights principles were
looked on with favor by all parties. To this large consensus of
opinion must be added the high authority of Story.71
The conclusions to be drawn from the procedure of Congress in
making appropriations is a more difficult matter.72 An examination
of appropriations for internal improvements show that they have in
more recent times been rested on some other specific power contained
in the Constitution, such as the interstate commerce, the postal and
the war clauses, and not on the "general welfare" provision. Such
justifications, however, had not occurred to Congress in the earlier
period, and "general welfare" was then relied upon.73 Thus, in 1792,
68. 1 FEDERALIST (1894) Nos. 30, 34. For an account of the attitude of the
convention towards the clause, see FARIAND, RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION (1907).
69. 1 FEDERALIST (1894) No. 14. For his later writings on the subject, see
"Report on the Resolutions," 6 WRITINGS (Hunt ed., 1910) 354-350, and the
"Veto Message of 1817," 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS (1898) 584-585. See also 1 BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEnATES £p
CONGRESS (1857) 350.
70. 4 WORKS (Lodge ed., 1898) 70, 151. Madison's view was supported
and emphasized by Jefferson, as stated in his "Opinion on the Constitutionality
of a National Bank" (February 15, 1791) 3 WRITINGS (Memorial ed.) 147-149.
Washington, in his final message to Congress indicated that he believed that
Congress possessed the widest discretion in taxation and appropriation by
recommending the establishment of a national university, manufacturers on
public account and encouragement to agriculture. 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (1898) 201-202.
71. STORY, COIMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1833) §§ 905-930, 958-991.
72. As to the weight which the judiciary should give to the opinions and
actions of other departmeiits, see Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299 (U. S. 1803);
Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 63 (U. S. 1825); United
States v. Healey, 160 U. S. 136 (1895); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U. S. 459 (1915); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901).
73. For an account of the history of internal improvements in the early
period see Monroe's, "Views of the President of the United States," 2 RIcHARDsoN,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (1898) 144. But these appropriations
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an appropriation from the general funds was made in order to pay
a bounty to the cod fisheries. 74  The sums which have been voted
from the general funds for the encouragement of agriculture, the
public health, education and the geological survey 75 likewise present
constitutional precedents for the independent nature of the "general
welfare" clause.
The case law offers at best an opportunity for the use of generous
comparisons and easy distinctions. The Supreme Court has not been
slow in availing itself of jurisdictional matters to shelve the sub-
stantive problem. In all of the cases where the issue was squarely
presented the Court was able to reserve the question.71 More or less
pertinent analogies and dicta may, however, be picked up wholesale
without particularly contributing to a determination of the problem 7
were in most instances not made from tax funds but by grants of land or from
funds derived from the sale of land, and as to such grants and appropriations it
is obvious that they are authorized by Article IV, section III, clause 2. Still they
amount to valid constitutional precedents notwithstanding.
74. 1 BENTON, supra note 69, at 346.
75. The following are some of the various bureaus and boards for which
appropriations have been made: The Weather Bureau, the Public Health
Service, the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Education, the Bureau of Mines,
the Bureau of Animal Husbandry, the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Bureau
of Soils, the Bureau of Markets, the Bureau of Fisheries, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the Children's Bureau, the Smithsonian Institute.
76. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892). In 1890 Congress provided a
bounty to sugar growers in lieu of a protective tariff, and when this was later
repealed an act directed the payment of bounties already earned. The bounty
law had not been questioned by any court or officers of the government; and
had been relied upon by sugar producers in investing large sums. The last act
was held valid, regardless of the validity of the original bounty, United States
v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427 (1896); Allen v. Smith, 173 U. S. 389 (1899). The
Maternity Act of 1921 provided for the promotion of the welfare and hygiene
of maternity and infancy, and authorized the appropriation to be apportioned
among such of the states as shall accept and comply with its provisions. It
was held that in the particular instances there was no interest sufficient to
zupport a contest of validity. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
77. See for instance United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U. S.
-668 (1896); Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924);
California v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., 127 U. S. 1 (1888); Loughborough v.
Blake, 5 Wheat. 317 (U. S. 1820) ; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (U. S. 1870) ;
United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425 (W. D. Mo. 1898); Mayor of New York v.
Miln, 11 Pet. 102 (U. S. 1837); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891); Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1906); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (U. S.
1868); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885); Keller v. United States, 213
U. S. 138 (1909); Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873); Loan Association
v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874); Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,
13 Pa. 104 (1850) ; In re Kollock, supra note 62; McCray v. United States, sV1pra
note 62; In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110 (1892); Child Labor Tax case, supra uoto
63; Hill v. Wallace, supra note 63.
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With such a respectable body of material which could with judgment
be marshalled either for or against, and with a Constitution that has
lent itself to striking variance of opinion as to its construction, he
would indeed be a bold prophet who would undertake to predict the
outcome. Constitutional law is sure to be influenced by ideas of
statecraft, and the decision that a power does or does not exist may
have been persuaded by conviction as to its wisdom. The scheme
itself is strange and new to the traditions of our government. It
concerns a submerged class whose welfare has not been pre-eminent
in the interpretation of legal doctrine. That behind this proposal
is paramount public need in a world of accomplished facts with which
we must come to the best terms possible must be granted. In such
cases the function of the Supreme Court is to accredit and direct the
desirable phases of the flux of economic events. Whether in the
performance of this task which the Court has wittingly or otherwise
assumed, it will be ready to go beyond the superficial facts of the
case to the place of maladjustment and to the envisaging of meaning
for the future, is necessarily a matter of guesswork. Probably no
one will now maintain that the profound duty of the Court is to
maintain a discreet ignorance of the outside world. But where the
judgment is not clear as to what are the best terms possible, where
there are other potential lines of development, too much judicial
objectivity may not be desirable. At the same time one must recog-
nize that although the Supreme Court has undoubtedly discarded
much of its faith in blind competition and the unassisted functioning
of the economic mechanism, still the older traditions of romantic
liberalism and hardy American individualism have not been eaten
away by the pressure of industrial change. In any specific instance
the Supreme Court will no doubt attempt to steer a course which
does not tend too much towards either disastrously uncontrolled
production or excessive governmental participation in industry.
Appraisals of this plan have been brought forth in all the Homeric
varieties of praise and censure that might have been expected. To
its advocates the plan assures immediate alleviation for widespread
suffering, an easy way of controlling a stubborn industry and general
assistance in the rehabilitation of the country. To its critics the
plan is a daring economic experiment with all the dangers of class
legislation and industrial protection and all the complexities of state
socialism. To more moderate viewpoints the plan represents r.
suggestion for improving future performance by a new method of
regulation that eliminates the disadvantages common to schemes for
direct governmental control, but which cannot by any stretch of
confidenc6 be guaranteed never to stray from the straight road. No
doubt the administration of the allotment plan would not be simple
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or easy. There would be opportunities in plenty for blunderifig,
petty favoritism and corruption. Congress seems determined to
eliminate the incentives and administrative devices used in the
Original version of the plan as presented in the Norbeck Hope Bill
which would make for a decentralized local control. In the Jones Bill,
the form in which the allotment plan passed the House of Repre-
sentatives, the entire regulation is thrown directly into the hands of
federal agents who fix the quota for the individual farmers and pay
the bounties ?8 upon a finding that the farmer has reduced his acreage,
No doubt the agents will not be entirely free from the pressure of
local opinion and of even less commendable influences.', However,
one may recall that we accept the mere affidavit of a man on his
income tax and there has been no compelling evidence of any con-
siderable evasion.80
78. In the form of certificates redeemable at the treasury.
79. In the original plan, it was provided that the Farm Board should
determine what the domestic consumption of, let us say, wheat, was for a
crop year. The Board was then to allot to each state a quota in proportion to
the average acreage planted in that state for the past five years multiplied by
the average yield per acre for the past twenty-five years. That quota fixed
the total number of bushels of wheat on which any state could draw the
adjustment charge from the treasury. In other words, the plan fixed the exact
amount beyond which no state could go in calling upon the Treasury. When the
state's quota was fixed, a state committee allotted to each county its pro-
portionate part of the quota. In each county a committee allotted to each
farmer his proportionate share of the quota. Under the Jones Bill an agent
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture pays the money to the farmer when
the agent is satisfied that the farmer has reduced his acreage 20 per cent.
If the farmer cheats the agent, the Treasury, and not his neighbor, suffers.
80. Other objections to the domestic allotment plan: (1) "Any attempt to
control the operation of the laws of supply and demand in a state of froo
competition is unsound in principle." In answer to this, it may 'be said that
reliance on the competitive elimination of high-cost men and high-cost acres,
has also its drawbacks. It means wholesale bankruptcies. It has the destructive
wastefulness of other uncontrolled natural laws. Letting the surplus problem
solve itself by progressive calamity is not creditable in a scientific age. (2)
"The plan is a gigantic sales tax on necessities and consequently would be moit
heavy on those with low incomes." On the other hand, however, it is urged
that consumers are already buying their food products much cheaper than any
other group of products they purchase. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (in November, 1932), since 1926 the decline in retail prices of food
has been one and one-half times as great as in any other group of products.
In increasing these prices to consumers, this plan does not place an unfair
tax upon them, but merely restores to farmers part of that which they have
lost through the price inequalities brought about during the depression. Even
after adding on the adjustment charges, retail prices of farm products would
still be lower than those of any other group. Furthermore, the fall or rise in
farm prices is not greatly reflected in retail prices. The price, for example, of"
flour is a very small part of the price of bread. It has been reliably estimated
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The suggestion which the Domestic Allotment Plan contains for
an easy method of control is now in the process of being developed
in a number of other ways. The so-called Farm Land Rental Plan
represents another proposal for indirect regulation of production
by means of the taxing and spending powers. Under this plan the
federal government would lease the land which is not needed in the
production of goods for domestic consumption. The funds required
to meet the rental costs would be raised by a tax on processors
similar to that proposed for financing the allotment plan. The plan
contemplates that since the lowest bid (and therefore presumably
the poorest) land would be leased, it would be the actual sub-marginal
land which would be eliminated. However, in comparison with the
allotment plan the scope of operation of this scheme seems mani-
festly inadequate. The program of farm relief placed before Congress
by President Roosevelt involves the use of both measures, either as
supplementary or alternative, in the discretion of the Secretary of
Agriculture. The Secretary of Agriculture would also be given
almost complete, discretion in working out the details of admin-
istration. He would determine the commodities to be included in
the program, how large a tax within certain limits to impose upon
processors, and if he finds that the tax discourages consumption of
one commodity, he may impose a tax on competing products. Such
enormous centralization of power and responsibility which rarely
that the Allotment Plan would only raise th price of bread one cent a loaf. (3)
it is obvious also that if the plan is not applied to all agricultural products
it may be difficult to apply it to a selected few. For cotton and wheat the
situation is comparatively simple. However, for pork the consequent increase
in price might have serious consequences since a scheme of control cannot be
so simply patterned about pork alone in view of the easy competition of other
meat products. (4) It may be argued that production cannot be controlled by
controlling acres, since output depends also on the weather and on insect pests
and plant diseases. Locally this is true. But taking the country as a whole
production is surprisingly uniform. In the last 25 years the average yield of
-wheat per acre has been 14.5 bushels. The highest yield was 17 bushels and the
lowest 12.2 bushels, a maximum variation above the average of only 17% and
below the average of 1%. See ANNUAi, REPORT OF SEca--rARY OF AGIICULTur
(1931) 29. In most of these years the yield was much closer to the average.
The volume of production, taking the country as a whole over a period of
years, is primarily determined by man rather than by nature. (5) Whether
this plan if put into operation might not prove a stronger political temptation
than our legislators could resist is perhaps the most serious question. Once
the plan is enacted Congress would be under constant compulsion to maintain
or raise the bounties without regard to the actual conditions of agriculture and
to apply them to agricultural products already well controlled, much as has
happened in the case of the tariff. The danger of a vested agricultural interest,
stronger politically than our present manufacturing interest, might prove to
be a very real one.
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has been given to any American official seems eminently justified in
view of the intricacies of the issues which will be involved and the
necessity for decisive action. 81
The Control of Production by Means of Debt Readjustment.
The above proposals make no attempt directly to cope with the
immediate and accelerating menace of farm debts. The solution of
this problem, however, is too critical to be left to the incidental
consequences of even a substantial rise in farm prices. The sweep
of events involved in the debt situation as well as in the more funda-
mental problem of overproduction is demanding direct action. To
this end currency inflation and bankruptcy legislation have been
somewhat vaguely proposed. Recognition of the possibility of cor-
relating debt relief with the limitation of production has been given
in a proposal which suggests that the scaling down of mortgage
indebtedness as well as the control of short term farm credit, might
be turned into an instrument for the regulation of output. The
solution to one problem would have the consequence of providing
also a solution to the other.8 2
In substance, the plan is based on the proposition that "Farm
credit should be dependent on farm earnings. . . . Therefore, since
farm earnings cannot exist in the face of overproduction, farm
credit should not be advanced or continued unless production is
limited." The plan contemplates that the substantial number of
farmers whose mortgages 83 are held by the banks of the two federal
banking systems (the Federal Reserve and the Federal Land Bank
systems) would be offered a reduction of principal and interest on
81. In addition, the President's program contemplates the immediate ap-
plication of the Smith cotton option contract plan. To any cotton producer
agreeing to reduce his cotton acreage 30%, will be given a non-transferable
option contract giving him the right to purchase within the year a portion of
the cotton surplus to which the government now has legal title. The producer
will pay the average price paid by the government in acquiring the cotton and
sell at the market price which is expected to rise simultaneously with the
curtailment in output. See U. S. Daily, March 6-18, 1933 at 17.
82. The authors of this plan are Thurman W. Arnold, Professor of Law,
Yale University and Wesley A. Sturges, Lines Professor of Law, Yale Uni-
versity. See Naw YORK TIMs, March 19, 1933, Section II, p. 1; NnW YoRK
HERALD-TRIBUNE March 19, 1933, Section IV, p. 7; Nnv HAVEN REGISTER, March
19, 1933, Section V, p. 4.
83. According to latest available figures the 9,463 billions of dollars invested
in farm mortgages are distributed as follows: Federal land banks, 12.1%;
joint stock land banks, 7.0%; commercial banks, 10.8%; mortgage companies,
10.4%; insurance companies, 22.9%; retired farmers, 10.6%; active farmers,
3.6%; other individuals, 15.4%; other agencies, 7.2%.
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their mortgage obligations in return for adherence to a production
schedule. s In addition, the federal government with the same pro-
gram in mind would offer to take over at a fair price the mortgages
held by banks, insurance companies, and other private financial
institutions whose capital is now frozen in farm mortgages, thereby
incidentally aiding in their rehabilitation. 0 Payment for these
mortgages would be made in Federal Land Bank bonds bearing the
current market rate of interest and guaranteed by the federal gov-
ernment. Furthermore, the extension of short-term credit by the
federal government upon which millions of farmers are absolutely
dependent, would be conditioned upon observance of the restriction
of output."; There are, however, a certain number of farmers who
are independently financing their own operations or resorting to
state banks. These could not, supposedly, be reached by the use of a
device which operates through the control of federal credit.8 T Con-
sequently, to adequately regulate production under this plan it is
proposed to use the supplementary device of an excise tax on sales
84. Farm mortgages owned by member banks of the Federal Reserve System
would be assigned to the Federal land bans of the districts where the farms
are located.
85. If a farmer fails to comply with his agreement as to production, the
mortgage shall be in full force and effect according to its original tenor.
86. At present there are six federal agencies engaged in ex\tending credit to
the farmer: member banks and the Federal Reserve banks of the Federal
Reserve System, Federal land banks and national farm loan associations, joint
stock land banks and Federal Intermediate Credit banks and national agricultural
credit corporations. In respect to these banking institutions and associations
whose powers are subject to direct regulation by Congress, the following
legislation is proposed:
"1. Statutory provisions limiting their powers to loan directly or indirectly
to any farmer for any agricultural purpose, or to discount or rediscount any
such loans for any farmer or any other person, unless the paper shall bear the
certificate of the Federal Land Bank of the district in which the farm is
located that the production of such farm is under the restriction of production
schedule hereinafter set out.
"2. This production schedule shall be a matter of contract between the
farmer and the Federal Land Bank in question and shall be the same as that
provided under this plan in case of farms subject to mortgage. In other
words, the execution of this contract shall be a condition upon which the farmer
may receive a certificate from the Federal Land Bank and the certificate chall
be a prerequisite to his obtaining credit from any of the banking institutions
enumerated above."
87. It may be suggested that the condition on discounting or rediscounting
of farm paper could be largely extended so as to include the discounting or
rediscounting of the paper of private financial and commercial houses which
are engaged in financing the farmers. In this way almost a univerzal effect
could be given to a federal credit policy.
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by farmers from which exemption will be granted upon proof of
compliance with the production schedule s8
There would not seem to be any constitutional issue involved in
requiring crop limitation as a condition of reducing principal and
interest of mortgages or of obtaining further credit from the credit
agencies of the federal government.80 However, an attempt to use
the taxing power in the fashion suggested would raise directly the
issue already referred to-the colorable use of an excise tax for
purposes of regulation. To a large extent the courts have indicated
that this matter is one of draftnanship of the statute. One conclusion
as to the constitutionality of the proposed tax seems clear; if the
revenue features of the tax are at all made manifest as means, for
example, of defraying the expenses of carrying the act into effect
and of compensating the government for losses arising out of reap-
praisals, the Court would not be driven to holding that the tax is not
a tax. Q Furthermore, the Court will not be blind to the necessities
88. The proration schedule required to avoid imposition of this tax would
be awarded on the same basis as in the case of a farmer applying for a
certificate in order to obtain credit or to gain a reduction of mortgage charges.
89. Any creditor may always forbear to collect the full amount of the
obligation due him. As a condition of this forbearance he may set any terms
he wishes, even though they be capricious or arbitrary. Following that
analogy the government as a creditor may impose a limitation of production
as a condition of its forbearing to collect the full amount due it. Neither is
the farmer bound by any long term contract. In any given year he may
remove the limitation of production by paying the face of the mortgage. Also
the government may direct the members of its banking system as to whom
they will advance credit. This has been done throughout banking history.
It is not different in principle from the raising and lowering of the rediscount
rate by the Federal Reserve, or the determining by Congress of what paper
may be eligible for rediscount.
90. The mere fact that a taxing statute is designed to regulate even a
business which might be held immune to direct legislative control Is not
sufficient to invalidate the tax. Thus a federal tax which was unquestionably
intended to regulate ticket brokers, a business which the Supreme Court has
decided cannot be directly supervised by the Legislature (Tyson & Brother
v. Banton, supra note 1), has been held in two cases to be constitutional.
Alexander Theatre Ticket Office v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 2d,
1927); F. Couthoui v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 158 (Ct. Cl. 1931). The
federal statute which was enacted in 1926 provided that when theatre tickets
are sold away from the ticket office the amount of any advance of not more
than fifty cents over the established price should be taxed at the rate of five (o,
but if the advance be more than fifty cents the total amount of the excess should
be taxed at the rate of fifty %. An amendment in 1928 substituted seventy-
five for fifty cents. See Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 780. That the proposed tax
would be held invalid must be predicated upon both of two propositions: (1)
Farm production, insofar as it is subject to regulation at all, is exclusively
a matter of state concern. (2) The tax must clearly appear on its face not
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of the situation which led to the enactment of the tax,91 nor to the
beneficial consequences intended to result from it,0-2 and it will like-
wise take cognizance of the admitted inability of the states effectively
to deal with the situation. 3 Finally much argument on this issue
might be avoided by simply putting a tax upon the sale of all farm
products and giving a bonus back to farmers who have reduced their
output much as does the taxing device proposed by the allotment plan.
As a satisfactory long time device for the regulation of prices and
production, no doubt this plan is open to criticism; it could be
practicable at least in certain of its aspects only while the debtor and
creditor relationship exists to an unusual degree.0 4 The patchwork
character of its structure, in view of the fact that the control of
production cannot be perfectly correlated with the relief of the debt
situation, stands out in sharp relief. At the same time some sort
of immediate constructive relief is necessary for the present pro-
tracted and disorganized liquidation. Aside from the wholesale
use of currency inflation,-5 any attempt adequately to solve the debt
to be a revenue measure. In the Child Labor Tax case, and Hill v. Wallace,
both supra note 63, the point emphasized by the court was that the act in
question indicated decisively by reason of its elaborate and detailed specifications
a purpose to regulate matters of state concern. In the sequel to Hill v. Wallace,
the federal Grain Future Act was sustained under the broad concept of pro-
tecting the flow of commodities in interstate commerce; Board of Trade of
Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923).
On the other hand the mere annexation of police regulations to a tax law
does not necessarily make the law an invalid exercise of the taxing power. The
question is merely one of degree; the extent of such regulations in a particular
instance may destroy the presumption of validity, but if they can be regarded
as sustaining some relation to the collection of the tax, their presence will be
tolerated. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (U. S. 18C6); McCray v. United
States, supra note 62; In re Kollock, supra note 62.
Further, it might be difficult to argue that the Police Power of the states is
being interfered with since in any event the states cannot regulate the pro-
duction or price of food or clothing. For the possibility that the Fifth
Amendment may not limit the federal taxing power as the Fourteenth
Amendment limits the taxing power of the states, see note 65, supra. There is
no equal protection clause in the Fifth Amendment which could be used to
restrict Congress in imposing an excise tax. See La Belle Iron Works v. United
States, 256 U. S. 377 (1921).
91. Cf. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, supra note 62.
92. Cf. the Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); and the Narcotic
Drug Cases, United States v. Doremus, supra note 62; Alston v. United States,
274 U. S. 289 (1927); Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332 (1928).
93. Cf. The Head Money Cases, supra note 92.
94. But see note 87, supra.
95. It is urged, however, that a scheme involving not the expansion of
money through the issue of new currency but the devaluation of the dollar by
reducing the number of grains of gold (roughly equivalent to England's going
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problem independently of the necessity for production control would
involve a profligate expenditure of public funds, and the collateral
effect in further stimulating output might prove to be a very great
disaster.00 The general project of the linking-up of credit with the
regulation of production may find substantial justification both as
emergency legislation and in the fact that to a considerable degree
the two problems are directly related.97
In Prospective
It is not necessary to attempt to pronounce finally for or against
any of these plans. Judged by absolute standards no one of them
- off the gold standard) would also increase the exports of the American farmer
through under-selling to foreign countries since the dollar income would still
conceal, at least temporarily, the reduced gold income. Nevertheless, in view
of the chaotic condition of the world market, even such level of competition as
this could hardly expect to meet with success.
96. Most prominent of these bills designed as provisional measures for the
refinancing of the farmer is the Robinson Bill (SEN. REP. No. 5390). Out-
standing in the bill is a provision for the creation of a one billion dollar
government agency, the "Emergency Agricultural Refinance Corporation" which
would lend up to $10,000 each to individual farmers on first or second mortgage
securities provided the amount of the mortgage does not exceed 75% of the
value of the property. In addition, the resources of the Federal Treasury
would be aligned behind the Federal Land banks in order to allow them to
take over all sound first mortgages offered by creditors who need to liquidate.
The joint stock land banks would be absorbed by the Federal System. For a
complete compilation of legislation on the subject, see LAWS RELATING TO
AGRICULTURE (1931) compiled by Elmer A. Lewis, Superintendent Document
Room, House of Representatives.
It has also been suggested that real estate mortgaging in the United States
is not sufficiently centralized or placed in the care of specialized financial
institutions under close government supervision. While the problem of farm
indebtedness is but a single phase of the severe consequences of deflation, the
application of a careful policy of financing would help to lessen the plagues of
foreclosures which are continually visiting agriculture. Incompetency, particu-
larly in the matter of land appraisals which' have too often been based not on
actual earning power but on expected real estate values and in the drafting of
amortization provisions, has had far-reaching consequences in view of the erratic
variations in farm income and the general depressed condition of agriculture
since the war.
97. Among the objections which have been raised to this plan as specifically
formulated, is the prospect of being compelled to wait several months while
appraisals of mortgages are being agreed upon, before the plan would begin to
operate effectively. This delay would eliminate the possibility of regulating
production during the present crop year. In addition, the taxing feature of the
plan presents administrative difficulties almost as great as those of the domestic
allotment proposal. In an industry where few operators keep account books,
the administrative difficulties involved in the operation of a program which
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seems likely to introduce industrial Utopia. Still they all offer that
chance for a beginning of the reorganization of farming which
is better than supine resignation to the existing anarchy and con-
fusion.98 No doubt the implacable catalogue of their sins can be
told off tediously, and then ended with the final warning that it is
not yet done, for the evils of devices so new and strange to the
traditions of our country cannot all be forecast. And he who would
scoff at the catalogue may point out that what we fear has a habit
of never materializing, and if anything should prove to be disastrous,
it will be, true to history, that which has never occurred to anyone.
Probably no easy solution exists which will put an end to existing
evils without creating new ones or which will square perfectly with
the law and the Constitution. No single stroke of the sword will
cut the Gordian knot, no invocation of genii can do the act. Most
difficult of all, perhaps, is the requirement that the practical must
wear the garb of what is politically feasible. Ideas must be sold in
high pressure style in a world where voters can be made to strain at
the gnat and swallow the camel. Violent prejudices exist against
means which seem to represent class legislation or which seem to
depart from the attitude of sturdy Americanism. Again, that
sometimes capricious barrier of the Constitution must be faced.
If something can be found which can be easily squared with it, so
much the better. If not, forward looking judges must be depended
upon to do a share.
Finally, the suggestions which these plans contain may prove to
be most significant as a step in an experimental process. Clearly
they all bear the mark of a Fabian retreat designed for the present
and cautiously awaiting the future. To the impatient such measures
might seem insufficient. However, to treat the tangible needs of
apparently would be ineffective without resort to a tax on sales, may readily
be seen.
98. Unfortunately at the present time there seems to be developing among
the farming interests a vague demand for agricultural relief which does not
involve any limitation of production whatever. This has been reflected in the
recent startling change of face on the part of the farmers themselves toward
the Allotment Plan, which had almost their undivided support at the time when
it was first proposed in Congress. No doubt over-production in a time when
many are without the merest necessities of life has appeared paradoxical.
Nor is "making more by working less" an idea that is in harmony with our
preconceived notions of what is reasonable. Still further there is the example
of many of the European countries who, to encourage farming in order to
secure national sufficiency, have fixed prices without of course restricting
production. Also the fact that the problem of mortgage debts has suddenly




the moment with the least possible friction with the established is,
in itself, when the larger issues have not yet been resolved, an end
that is well worth striving for. Indeed the greater difficulty of
agriculture, which is an epitome of the adjustment we are now
being called on to make in our industrial culture, has not even yet
been stated. It is not the matter of the isolation of the farmer and
the treating of his individual needs either temporary or long time,
but of the association of farming with other industries, of gaining
perspective rather than sharpness of focus. Technology in the long
career ahead of it will require a vast elimination of land and people
from agriculture. Expansion of demand will be principally in other
directions than that of farm products. The general problem is so
immense that it would be naive to look forward to a quick and de-
cisive solution. Constructive planning for a long time to come Nill
mean doing only things which solve issues as they arise and which
may carry in their wake larger commitments. To catch the industrial
culture as a going concern is beyond the capacity of a legal system.
For the future all that can be accomplished is an orientation. Even
if there is someone so far-seeing as to understand the answer to our
economic enigmas, he will at the same time appreciate that law and
politics must first be prepared for it. We quote again from the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the New State Ice Co.
case.99
"We have been none too successful in the modest essays in economic
control already entered upon. . . . Yet the advances in the exact sciences
and the achievement in invention remind us that the seemingly impossible
sometimes happens. . . . In large measure, those advances have been
due to experimentation. . . . To stay experimentation in things social
and-eConomic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. . . . If we
would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."
99. Supra note 1, at 310 et seq.
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